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JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE. By Paula DiPerna. 
New York: Dembner Books. 1984. Pp. vii, 248. $17.50. 
Responding to a jury summons, free lance writer Paula DiPerna 1 
found herself in a dimly lit courthouse where she was questioned, edu-
cated, and eventually excused by the court for jury service in a child 
pornography trial. The experience captured her interest, and she sub-
sequently undertook to write Juries on Trial, a personal analysis and 
defense of the American jury system. Her theme is that the jury sys-
tem is "an original good idea" with tremendous potential for improve-
ment. Much more than simply her own personal story, her book 
examines several common criticisms of juries, describes how the jury 
system actually performs through individual case examples, and sug-
gests measures that would improve its performance.2 What makes this 
book important is that DiPerna uses a juror's perspective and skillfully 
combines jurors', judges', and attorneys' stories with trial transcripts, 
reported opinions, statistical studies, and legal literature. Juries on 
Trial, rather than a conclusive legal analysis, is the product of an intel-
ligent layperson's extensive research. It is an enjoyable and thoughtful 
description of the strengths and weaknesses of the jury system. 
DiPerna devotes much of her book to a discussion of jury selec-
tion, a process which has received much criticism.3 She argues that 
the system selects juries that are not racially or socially representative, 
and that current methods of choosing the venire panel, excusing jurors 
before voir dire, and voir dire all contribute to this imbalance. After 
briefly examining the theoretical and historical ,meaning of a jury of 
peers as well as legal efforts to secure impartial and representative ve-
nire panels, the author describes the continued underrepresentation of 
minorities in jury pools, using individual cases as examples.4 In one 
1. Paula DiPema is the author of numerous articles on the environment, working women, 
health, and education for the New York Times, The Nation, and Working Woman. She is a 
contributing editor to The Cousteau Almanac. 
2. DiPema also provides the reader with a historical understanding of the jury early in her 
book. She traces the history of juries from Athenian dicastery, the huge group drawn by lot to 
vote with colored stones on an accused's fate, through England's primitive trial by ordeal, to the 
early American juries that vigorously exercised their right to decide the law. Pp. 21-30. 
3. P. 174. See, e.g., J. v AN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); see also Johnson, Black Innocence and the 
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1659 n.242, 1661-62 nn.267-69 (1985) (listing 19 recent law 
review articles and notes examining racial prejudice in the use of peremptory challenges). 
4. The sixth amendment guarantees a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Discrimination in venire selection may also violate the 
fourteenth amendment. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 
587 (1935). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 gives federal litigants a statutory right to 
juries "selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community in the district or division 
wherein the court convenes" and prohibits exclusion from jury service "on account of race, color, 
1030 
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town, 
jury lists are culled from voter lists, which still, it is claimed, seriously 
underrepresent blacks. Then, according to the town clerk, the jury list is 
"revised" by jury revisers - a half-dozen local people who, going by 
their personal knowledge of the community, remove the names of people 
who have died or moved away, and add those they think would make 
good jurors. There is nothing to prevent them from tampering with the 
list, consciously or unconsciously; their meetings are secret, and they 
will not talk about how they do their job. 
[This] happens in other small towns still, especially in the South, but 
elsewhere in the country as well, where few questions are asked about 
the legality of it. 5 
The second "cut," excusing jurors by request or exemption, also 
skews representation by eliminating "whole categories of people" (p. 
86). Some states automatically excuse .attorneys, doctors, nurses, 
firefighters, pharmacists, teachers, or women with young children. 
Many low income and self-employed potential jurors are excused for 
economic hardship because their employers will not pay the difference 
between lost wages and the average juror fee of $10 per day (pp. 85-
87). DiPerna supplements existing critiques6 of this long-recognized 
problem with her firsthand observations and stories. 
The stage at which "the idea of an impartial jury of one's peers 
takes the most abuse," however, is voir dire (p. 90). Characterizing 
jury selection as the manipulation of bias, DiPerna criticizes attorneys 
for choosing the least offensive, least independent, and least informed 
jurors. Peremptory challenge abuse, she notes, has been allowed to 
continue, and "remedies remain elusive because of the knotted consti-
tutional issues involved. . . . [B]ecause there is no effective control and 
no real way to get caught, attorneys continue to flavor their peremp-
tory challenge use with racial bias" (p. 174). All-white juries are not 
only more likely to be biased against nonwhite defendants (p. 152), 
they are not representative because it is hard for a white to identify 
with what being black means (p. 163). In case after case, DiPerna 
shows how prosecutors all over the country use peremptory challenges 
to eliminate blacks and Hispanics from juries. 7 Racial prejudice in 
jury selection is also reflected in some judges' reluctance to excuse ra-
cially biased jurors for cause: 
One white male juror - named White ... - when asked if he thought 
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (1982). Most of 
DiPerna's examples are state cases. 
5. Pp. 83-84. The "key-man" system described here is still in use in about a third of the 
states. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 708 (1984). 
6. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO JURY USE AND MANAGEMENT 131-32 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as STANDARDS]; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3. 
7. In ·this section, and others throughout the book, DiPerna draws from personal observa-
tions and interviews which, without references, are essentially unverifiable. 
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of black people as his social equals ... said, "Some of my best friends are 
black." Farmer [the attorney] then asked how it was that these best 
friends had never been to his house. White answered, "We're in the 
South. It's a custom, I guess. It's just like a dog. I don't believe a dog 
ought to be in the house." Farmer immediately moved to challenge this 
man for cause on the basis of racial prejudice, but the prosecutor ob-
jected. The judge intervened: "Do you mean by that you consider a 
black person as a dog?" But before White could reply, the judge rehabil-
itated the man's answer himself: "It means that some people believe in 
house dogs, and some people don't." The juror simply affirmed. "That's 
right." Thus, the defense had to spend a peremptory challenge on White 
and others like him. 8 
DiPerna's conclusion that systematic underrepresentation is a 
widespread problem is sound.9 She suggests no solutions, however, to 
support the optimism evident in her discussion. She argues that the 
standard the Court set in Swain v. Alabama10 to measure unconstitu-
tional systematic use of the peremptory challenge to strike blacks is 
nearly impossible for a defendant to meet. DiPerna's interpretation of 
Swain is shared by many. 11 She does not endorse any particular alter-
native to the Swain rule, however, nor does she propose one of her 
own. In discussing one alternative, California's requirement that an 
attorney justify her challenge at the bench when questioned by oppos-
ing counsel, DiPerna doubts how effectively it is enforced.12 She sug-
gests that the American public, disillusioned with the increasing time 
and expense consumed by trials and opposed to more protections for 
criminal defendants, would not welcome California's approach nor the 
idea of reducing the number of peremptory challenges available to the 
prosecutor. "Abuse of the peremptory challenge," she says, "makes 
jury selection ... a political act and renders today's courtroom a well-
spring of potential long- and short-term consequences, including racial 
tension and violence. Its political aspect makes the peremptory issue a 
hot potato" (p. 178). Although her treatment of possible peremptory 
8. P. 161. On a defendant's right to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice at voir 
dire, see Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 
720-22. 
9. See Johnson, supra note 3; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 (1986) 
("The reality of practice, amply reflected in many state and federal court opinions, shows that the 
[peremptory] challenge may be, and ... has been, used to discriminate against black jurors."), 
10. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Court explained that systematic striking of black jurors would 
raise a prima facie case of discrimination under the fourteenth amendment 
when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumst~nces, whatever 
the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of 
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have 
survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries •• , • 
380 U.S. at 223. The Court has recently rejected part of Swain's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 
106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719-24 (1986). 
11. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 n.14 (1986) (listing critiques). 
12. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
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reforms is superficial compared with recent legal works on the issue, 13 
her use of graphic examples and personal interviews successfully por-
trays the gravity of the problem. 
Most of DiPema's recommendations to improve other aspects of 
jury selection have some support in the legal literature (eliminating 
automatic jury exemptions and encouraging more judge-conducted 
voir dire, for example).14 One change she suggests, developing a plan 
of government jury service insurance to reimburse jurors for lost in-
come, appears dubious. 15 She cites no support for this proposal and 
fails to develop the idea enough to convince the reader of its viability. 
Despite its occasional flaws, her treatment of jury selection is, overall, 
very readable and thought-provoking. 
DiPema does not believe that other criticisms of the jury system 
are troublesome ones. For example, she rejects the idea that profes-
sional jury research results in injustice by "squeez[ing] out the ran-
domness that is the keystone of the jury system" (p. 133). She 
describes the successes, failures, and techniques of hired jury pickers, 
drawing from the famous trials of Mark David Chapman (tried for 
shooting John Lennon), Jean Harris, Sacco and Vanzetti, Angela Da-
vis, Dr. Benjamin Spock, John Mitchell and Maurice Stans, the Pinto 
case, and MCI's antitrust suit against AT&T (pp. 130-50). Although 
DiPema fears that "increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques" 
may make the jury of the future "highly susceptible to manipulation," 
she suggests that jurors' unpredictability will foil the efforts of prose-
cutors, plaintiffs, and defendants to control verdicts through jury se-
lection (pp. 149-50). 
Many complain that juries are "susceptible to being moved by fac-
tors which do not have to do with the evidence" and that such jury 
misconduct is too often undiscovered (p. 218). DiPema agrees, and 
recounts amazing incidents of juries that decided to create their own 
evidence, including jury members who bit each other's arms to see 
how long teeth marks last and a jury that determined a tight skirt in 
evidence could be raised high enough for a rape to have occurred by 
dressing the smallest member of the all-male jury in the skirt to test it 
(pp. 218-19). DiPema's suggestion that this independence could be ad-
13. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3; Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the 
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982); Note, The 
Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1770 (1979). 
14. See, e.g., Note, Judge Conducted Voir Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 161 (1970); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 722 & n.23. The 
American Bar Association recommends that all automatic excuses or statutory group exemp-
tions be eliminated. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 61. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra 
note 3. 
15. P. 225. Currently private business finances up to 68% of the cost of the jury system. 
Raising juror fees to current wage levels would be a "nearly impossible burden" for many juris-
dictions. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 131. 
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equately controlled if judges "warn jurors very specifically against the 
reconstruction of events" (p. 220) is hardly groundbreaking, but her 
illustrations provide an amusing, yet unsettling, reminder that miscon-
duct occurs. 
The author writes glowingly of jury nullification, the historic 
power of juries to refuse to follow the rules of law, still exercised 
openly in some states today. 16 Her chapter entitled "Power to the 
Jury?" begins with an account of the trial and jury deliberations in the 
case of a young woman, charged with the murder of her father, who 
claimed self-defense in response to a pattern of sexual abuse. After 
interviewing the jurors months after the conviction, DiPerna con-
cluded that "had [they] been charged that they had the right to dissent 
from the law, conceivably an acquittal could have held sway" (p. 190). 
She seems to agree with expert Hans Zeisel, however, that for more 
states to add instructions informing jurors of their right to nullify 
would be an "invitation to lawlessness" (p. 192). Infrequent and fla-
grant abuse of the jury's nullification power is controllable, in her 
view, by clearer charges, public education, appeal, the power of the 
judge to render a judgment against the verdict, and use of the special 
verdict.17 
She defends high jury awards in civil cases, another commonly 
criticized aspect of the jury system, quoting an attorney, "It is only 
when the plaintiff wins a lot of money that we hear about juries being 
'hogwild.' How come 'hogwild' doesn't apply when the jury under-
awards?" (p. 207). To eliminate juries in civil cases, she believes, 
would deny a voice to individual citizens - those most affected by 
litigation in product liability, consumer fraud, medical malpractice, 
environmental hazards, and other areas of law. Responding to com-
plaints that juries in civil cases cause delay, she recognizes that bench 
trials take forty percent less time than jury trials, but implies that 
eliminating civil juries would not increase the efficiency of civil trials 
significantly because jury cases are more "unclear" than bench cases 
(p. 221). Except for this questionable suggestion,18 DiPerna's defense 
of the use of civil juries is echoed by many authorities. 19 
Despite the complaints, public cynicism, and pressure to speed up 
cases, DiPerna maintains that the jury system is indispensable. She 
16. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 700·02. 
17. DiPerna's optimism in this regard is shared by many, but not all. See Broeder, The 
Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fiction, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 412-13 (1954) (jury is inconsis-
tent and highly unrepresentative "law-dispenser"); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institutio11, 
16 CATH. LAW. 224, 240-41 (1970) (jury nullification "is an important safeguard that should be 
recognized and strengthened"). See generally Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE. 
L.J. 1023, 1025-32 (1974). 
18. DiPerna offers no support for her interpretation of the relative complexity of bench and 
jury trials, and her conclusion seems far from obvious to this reader. P. 221. 
19. See, e.g., Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1057-61 (1964). 
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calls it the most "active hands-on civic duty" and suggests that it pro-
vides a "direct way of having a say in the proceedings of society" (p. 
2). In her view, the jury is a political institution, needed to decide 
important social and political issues in the courts. The capable juror 
takes his or her duty to deliberate very seriously, and, she believes, is 
less jaded and more attentive than most judges (p. 221). Reform is 
necessary not only to minimize jury manipulation, but to ensure that 
jury service is not so burdensome that potentially good jurors will try 
to avoid it. She suggests using the one day/one trial technique,20 en-
couraging more frequent jury service by attorneys and even judges,21 
allowing jurors to take notes and ask questions, providing simpler, 
written jury instructions, treating jurors courteously, and interviewing 
jurors to collect needed information. Although these pleas for reform 
are not novel,22 the author's collection of illustrative cases and intelli-
gent personal observations about the wide range of current jury issues 
is impressive and unique. 
The book's usefulness as a legal authority or research tool is lim-
ited by the lack of footnotes and bibliography. Despite this, DiPerna's 
research seems thorough and her conclusions well-informed. She re-
fers to several Supreme Court cases, legal periodicals, books, and stud-
ies throughout the text. She also uses interviews with prominent legal 
authorities on the American jury, including Hans Zeise! and Rita Si-
mon. 23 Juries on Trial would be helpful to anyone, especially a juror, 
attorney, or student, who seeks an engaging explanation of the history 
and vitality of juries and the potential for improvement of the jury 
system. 
- Nancy J. King 
20. The one day/one trial technique ensures that a juror will serve no longer than.the dura-
tion of one trial for which she is impaneled or one day if not impaneled. This system results in 
more efficient juror usage, less inconvenience to jurors, and fewer excuses from juror duty. See 
generally K. CARLSON, A. HALPER & D. WHITCOMB, ONE DAY/ONE TRIAL JURY SYSTEM 
(1977); STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 55-59. 
21. For one view of how a judge gained valuable insights from jury duty, see Battani, Have 
You Reached A Verdict, .64 MICH. B.J. 966 (1985). 
22. See generally A. CAIN & M. KRAVITZ, JURY REFORM: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(1978); STANDARDS, supra note 6. 
23. Both Simon and Zeise! are authors of several works on the jury, including R. SIMON, 
THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY (1966). DiPema lists several titles and individuals in a convenient index at the end of 
the book. 
